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The Power and Limits of Russia’s Strategic Narrative in Ukraine: 
The Role of Linkage 
Dr Joanna Szostek 
Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow, Royal Holloway, University of London 
 
ABSTRACT: Governments project strategic narratives about international affairs, hoping 
thereby to shape the perceptions and behaviour of foreign audiences. If individuals 
encounter incompatible narratives projected by different states, how can their 
acceptance of one narrative over another be explained? This article suggests that 
support for the strategic narrative of a foreign government is more likely when there is 
social and communicative linkage at the individual level, i.e. when an individual 
maintains personal and cultural connections to the foreign state through regular travel, 
media consumption, religious attendance and conversations with friends or relatives. 
The role of linkage is demonstrated in Ukraine, where a ‘pro-Russian, anti-Western’ 
narrative projected from Moscow has been competing against a ‘pro-Western, anti-
Russian’ narrative projected from Kyiv. Previous accounts of international persuasion 
have been framed in terms of a state’s resources producing advantageous ‘soft power’. 
However, this article proposes a shift in focus: from the resources states have to what 
individuals do to maintain social and communicative ties via which ideas cross borders. 
In a competitive discursive environment, such linkage can in fact have mixed 
consequences for the states involved, as the Ukrainian case illustrates. 
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There is arguably no activity more central to the conduct of foreign policy than persuasive 
communication. Pursuing policy objectives on the international stage, without recourse to coercion, 
usually entails ‘getting a message across’ to the various allies and opponents whose responses can 
determine or sometimes constitute the policy’s success or failure. 
Persuasive communication by states in the service of foreign policy goals has evolved from an 
historically elite-focused activity (i.e. traditional diplomacy) to a much broader endeavour 
encompassing the general public. Governments today consider the ability to communicate with 
mass audiences in other parts of the world to be an important element of national power. Many of 
them accordingly spend substantial budget funds on facilitating such communication via 
international broadcasters,1 cultural centres abroad,2 and public relations strategists.3 Yet these 
efforts do not reliably generate the desired impact. A state may spend any amount of money on 
disseminating messages about itself and the world, but the results will ultimately still hinge on 
factors that are largely beyond its control – including the attributes of (multiple, diverse) receiving 
audiences and the discursive context.  
The conditions under which a state is likely to win support for its messages among foreign mass 
audiences are not well theorised within International Relations. The conceptual framework of ‘soft 
power’ still dominates the literature on state-led efforts to persuade,4  despite being widely 
criticised.5 Soft – ‘attractive’, ‘persuasive’ – power is often depicted as the product of resources: 
Joseph Nye argues that such power accrues to countries which have ‘multiple channels of 
communication’,6 ‘universalistic’ ideas, culture and values,7 and ‘skill’ at converting these resources 
into desired outcomes.8 It is therefore unsurprising that scholarship proceeding from this framework 
has concentrated mainly on the actions, attributes and assets of states which aspire to ‘wield’ soft 
power,9 while the reception component of the persuasive equation has been rather neglected.10 
Studies systematically investigating why particular audiences respond the way they do to messages 
projected by foreign governments are hard to find.11 
The present article switches the focus firmly towards the audience by adopting the conceptual 
framework of strategic narrative – an alternative to the ‘soft power’ lens which is relatively 
straightforward to operationalise for a study of reception. 12 The article investigates reception of rival 
strategic narratives in Ukraine, a country central to the recent tensions between Russia and Western 
states. After the Ukrainian president was toppled by protests in 2014, most Western governments 
and Ukraine’s new leadership narrated the events in terms of a pro-democracy revolution against 
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the corrupt ancien regime. Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea and backing for separatists in 
Donbas they narrated as illegal actions by an irresponsible aggressor. In stark contrast, the Russian 
government projected a narrative in which the Ukrainian president’s ousting was an illegitimate 
Western-backed coup, while its own policies vis-à-vis Crimea and Donbas were based on 
humanitarian need and historical justice. These conflicting and still evolving ‘anti-Russian’ (‘pro-
Western’) and ‘anti-Western’ (‘pro-Russian’) narratives are both accessible to Ukrainian audiences. 
The aim of this article is to identify factors associated with an individual’s support for one narrative 
over the other – and through this analysis to deepen theoretical thinking about cross-border 
persuasive communication and its consequences. 
The empirical research presented here comes from a representative survey (n = 1,000) conducted 
among the adult population of Ukraine’s Odesa Region in February 2016. The survey was designed 
to gauge support for the conflicting narratives projected in the preceding months by the Russian and 
Ukrainian leaderships. Analysis of the survey responses indicates that an individual’s support for the 
Russian state’s ‘anti-Western’ strategic narrative over the Ukrainian state’s ‘anti-Russian’ strategic 
narrative is predicted by factors related to media use (a preference for watching TV only in the 
Russian language and reliance on Russian news sources) as well as personal ties to Russia and 
Russian culture (regularly attending an Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, regularly 
travelling to Russia or speaking to friends and relatives there). 
The article interprets these predictors of support for Russia’s strategic narrative as types of ‘linkage’, 
rather than manifestations of soft power. The concept of linkage was proposed by Steven Levitsky 
and Lucan Way to explain why (or why not) certain regimes democratised after the end of the Cold 
War.13 Defining it as ‘the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) 
and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) between particular 
countries’,14 they showed democratisation to be more likely in countries where linkage to the West 
was stronger. Far from being a collection of wieldable resources which one state can deploy against 
another, linkage is ‘mostly a product of geography, of such historical factors as colonialism and 
geostrategic alliances, and of long-term processes of social and economic integration’.15 This idea of 
linkage is developed here as an aid to explain the reception of strategic narratives in Ukraine. 
Crucially, the article identifies the potential role of social and communication linkage at the 
individual level in determining which narratives participants find convincing. 
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The article begins with a discussion of prior research relating to international persuasive 
communication, the role of the media in recent Russian foreign policy, and Ukrainian public opinion. 
The study’s research design is then explained, and models are presented which predict support for 
the Russian strategic narrative among Ukrainians. The final sections of the article reflect on the 
implications of the study’s findings and elaborate on how to incorporate the idea of linkage into a 
theory of strategic narrative reception. The article argues for a more holistic appreciation of how 
views of international politics shape and are shaped by the social and communicative practices of 
individuals. It uses the idea of linkage to move debates about narrative reception and persuasive 
‘power’ beyond the simplistic ‘stimulus-response’ view of media effects. 
International persuasive communication: Concepts and theory 
What explains the ability or failure of a particular state to win support and approval among foreign 
populations? Nye would frame that question as what makes a state ‘attractive’ and his answer 
would point to the given state’s policies, culture, and values, along with their effective 
communication. The ‘(re)sources’ of Nye’s soft power are not all controlled by governments: he 
allows that civil society, non-governmental organisations and private commercial actors can all be 
involved in ‘generating attraction’ for their country of origin.16 But government officials across the 
world are operating in the belief that their own state-funded soft power projects can make a 
positive difference – and it is these efforts which have attracted most attention in the soft power 
literature. A wealth of studies describe the measures state officials are taking in their desire to shape 
international public opinion,17 and political discourse surrounding these measures has also been 
researched.18 What is missing from this literature, however, is evidence-based theory regarding how 
perceptions of foreign countries take shape among mass publics. The exercise of soft power is 
discussed as ‘a long-term process that should be barely noticeable’,19 which almost excludes the 
prospect of tracing it empirically. Consequently, the soft power concept has become in practice ‘a 
complex of assumptions about the modalities of influence’;20 it is much more about what states do 
for influence than about how influence is actually achieved. 
Two assumptions are particularly integral to soft power policies and scholarship. The first is that an 
individual is likely to look more favourably on a foreign country after getting to know its language 
and way of life: familiarity and personal contact are expected to engender affinity. This underlies the 
allocation of state funding to exchange programmes and language/cultural institutes,21 as well as 
expectations that an internationalised higher education sector will produce soft power dividends.22 
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The second assumption is that certain kinds of journalistic output are likely to produce more positive 
public evaluations of particular states. Opinions vary as to what kind of journalism will generate the 
desired effect: the UK government believes it benefits from the BBC’s reputation for impartiality,23 
whereas other governments prefer their international broadcasters to take a more overtly patriotic 
line. Either way, confidence in the mass media’s ability to shape foreign public opinion is reflected in 
state financing for a multitude of internationally-oriented channels, news agencies, websites and 
publications.24 
What evidence supports these two core soft power assumptions? In the field of social psychology 
there is considerable if qualified support for intergroup contact theory – the idea that greater 
personal interaction with an outgroup reduces prejudice and hostility towards that outgroup, 
provided certain conditions are met.25 An inverse relationship between contact and prejudice at the 
individual level has been found across many contexts, so it seems reasonable to expect a person to 
think more highly (or at least less negatively) about citizens from a particular foreign country, the 
more (s)he interacts with citizens of that country through travel, international exchanges and so on. 
The extent to which affinity towards foreign individuals translates into to affinity towards the foreign 
state and its policies is less clear, however.26 It is worth noting the argument of Hugh Forbes,27 who 
suggests that contact at an individual level can ultimately exacerbate tensions at an aggregate level, 
because contact leads to assimilation, which may be resented by sections of the community that is 
being assimilated.  
Evidence to support the assumption that the media shape public opinion about foreign states 
likewise exists without being clear-cut. One recent study found a weak but positive relationship 
between China’s ‘media footprint’ in African countries (i.e. Chinese involvement in local media 
environments) and the likelihood of those countries’ citizens looking favourably upon Chinese 
influence.28 However, the impact of media content was hard to assess, since the ‘media footprint’ 
variable was based on Chinese telecom investment as well as the presence or absence of several 
Chinese news outlets. In earlier research, William Gamson’s classic focus-group study of how 
individuals construct meaning from the news suggested that media discourse was more influential 
than ‘popular wisdom’ and ‘experiential knowledge’ where foreign affairs (specifically, the Arab-
Israeli conflict) were concerned.29 Paul Brewer and colleagues found that students evaluated Mexico 
and Columbia more highly following exposure to stories which framed those countries as American 
allies in the war on drugs. The authors concluded that ‘a clear story – a frame that explains what 
issue is at stake and on which side of the issue the foreign nation stands’ could shape how a mass 
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audience judges another country.30 However, the connection between favourable/unfavourable 
media coverage and favourable/unfavourable public opinion about a country does not seem to hold 
in all circumstances. Wayne Wanta and colleagues observed a correlation between negative 
coverage of countries in American newscasts and low approval ratings of those countries among the 
American public – yet they observed no association between positive coverage and positive public 
perceptions.31 Another study found that measures of media attention explained less variation in 
opinions about West Germany than having German friends or relatives, German ancestry and 
experience of travelling to Europe. For perceptions of East Germany, age was the strongest predictor 
of negative views.32 Some scholars have argued that images of enemies may be particularly stable 
and inertial elements in international belief systems and resistant to change in the face of dramatic 
turnarounds in events.33 
Thanks to the internet, individuals today can access a greater range of news sources than ever 
before. If tracing media influence on perceptions of other countries was challenging in previous 
decades, it is even harder now. It has been suggested that the media’s potential to direct public 
opinion may be diminishing as people acquire greater scope for selective exposure and general news 
avoidance.34 Yet the lack of firm evidence regarding the media’s ability to shape public opinion on 
foreign affairs has not halted the expansion of international state-funded broadcasters. Nor has it 
assuaged Western anxieties about the efforts made by authoritarian states to sway the thinking of 
international audiences. 
Persuasion and Russian foreign policy 
Russia (and, to a lesser degree, China) stands accused of ‘hijacking soft power’ in an assault on 
democratic values.35 Rather than aiming for genuine persuasion, Russia’s leadership is said to be 
trying to ‘pollute the information space, increase polarization and undermine democratic debate’,36 
creating so much confusion that people conclude ‘nothing is true’ and ‘everything is possible’.37 The 
Russian government’s (mis)use of mass media in foreign policy became a matter of heightened 
Western concern in 2014, when Crimea was annexed and conflict broke out in Ukraine’s eastern 
Donbas region. During these events Russian state-controlled TV channels were repeatedly observed 
using ‘outright fakery’ to support a narrative which absolved the Russian side of wrongdoing and 
painted Ukraine’s newly installed pro-Western authorities as brutal and illegitimate.38 Notorious 
examples of faked Russian news include the alleged crucifixion of a toddler by Ukrainian troops,39 
multiple far-fetched theories of how Ukrainian forces might have downed the airliner MH17,40 and 
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claims that Ukrainian schoolchildren were being taught to kill bullfinches because the birds share the 
colours of the Russian flag.41 Several organisations now exist to identify, record and ‘debunk’ 
fabricated news stories in the Russian media.42 
Influencing public opinion abroad via the media is in fact a longstanding ambition of Russian 
policymakers which predates the crisis in Ukraine. It is mentioned as an explicit goal in all four of the 
Foreign Policy Concepts which Russia has issued since 2000 (these keynote documents summarise 
Russia’s international priorities). A significant change, however, is observable in the language and 
logic underlying this desire for media influence. Back in 2000 – when Vladimir Putin had just 
assumed the Russian presidency for the first time – the primary stated aim was to ‘form a positive 
understanding of Russia abroad and a friendly attitude towards it’.43 By 2016 all references to 
‘friendly attitudes’ had disappeared; the emphasis now lies on ‘countering threats to information 
security’.44 The latest Russian Doctrine of Information Security complains about foreign states using 
information technologies to ‘undermine the sovereignty, the political and social stability and the 
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies’.45 A desire to counteract these alleged 
attempts to weaken Russia is at the heart of Russian communication policy. In Moscow, information 
is perceived as a weapon which the West has used effectively against Russia – to inspire the so-
called ‘coloured revolutions’, for example.46 By the same logic, Russian state media are regarded as 
weapons for the defence of Russian interests both at home and abroad. 
Disinformation and ‘whataboutism’ undoubtedly feature strongly in Russian state-sponsored media 
content, but from this it would be wrong to conclude that the Russian leadership has no interest in 
persuading international audiences and seeks only to ‘dismiss, distort, distract and dismay’.47 For 
years, a highly consistent narrative has run through the content of Russian state-controlled media 
and official statements. The narrative problematizes American or Western ‘hypocrisy’ and 
‘interference’; blames these traits for global instability; and advocates a ‘multipolar’ world as the 
optimal solution, in which non-Western states such as Russia would balance American power.48 The 
consistency of this narrative would be both unnecessary and unlikely if the Russian leadership had 
no desire for the narrative to be taken seriously. Falsifications are used to support the narrative – 
but they are not intended to turn everyone listening into nihilists for whom ‘nothing is true’. 
Policy documents also indicate that Russia has had long-term goals vis-à-vis international audiences 
which extend beyond disruption, and this is particularly true in the case of Ukraine. The goal of 
helping Russian ‘diasporas’ and ‘compatriots’ abroad to preserve their ‘ethno-cultural identity’ and 
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‘ties to the historic motherland’ is explicit in the Foreign Policy Concepts of 2008, 2013 and 2016. 
Ukraine was highlighted as a priority partner, which the Russian leadership wanted to draw into 
‘deeper processes of integration’.49 Essentially, the Russian leadership was hoping most Ukrainians 
would fall into line with its preferred narrative about their identity – as a population with historic, 
linguistic and cultural ties to Russia that ought to be preserved in new structures of regional alliance. 
With this aim in mind they made every effort preserve channels of communication from Russia to 
the mass Ukrainian audience, but outcomes ultimately fell well short of their aspirations. 
Ukrainian attitudes towards Russia before and after the ‘revolution of dignity’ 
At least until 2014, attitudes towards Russia were one of the main lines of cleavage in Ukrainian 
politics.50 An extensive area studies literature addresses the fluctuating but fairly even divide in 
Ukrainian public opinion about relations with Russia that existed during the first 20 or so years of 
Ukraine’s independence. This literature, based on nationally representative surveys, is almost 
completely detached from research on soft power and persuasive cross-border communication. 
Table 1 lists almost a dozen relevant studies, along with the explanatory variables that were 
investigated and linked (or not) to variation in views (please note that all the tables mentioned in 
this article can be found in the Supplementary Materials).51 The general consensus was that ‘the 
combination of where one lives, what language(s) one speaks, what one’s ethnic identity is, and 
what religious group one is in tells us a great deal about mass attitudes in Ukraine’ where Russia is 
concerned.52 Speaking Russian rather than Ukrainian, living in an Eastern region rather than a 
Western one, identifying as ‘ethnic Russian’ and ‘Orthodox’ (sometimes just religious), being less 
well-off and older were the factors most frequently associated with ‘pro-Russian’ (and 
correspondingly ‘anti-Western’) sentiments. However, there was some disagreement as to whether 
region of residence had an autonomous effect, or whether observed regional variations were due to 
the ‘compositional’ influence of linguistic, ethnic and religious differences.53 Another point of debate 
was how to treat variables which do not lend themselves to straightforward categorisation; in 
Ukraine this applies to region, language and ethnicity. It is striking that media consumption was not 
included as a predictor in any of the listed studies – despite use of Russia-based media having been 
widespread in Ukraine for a long time and television being considered a major influence on 
geopolitical imaginations.54 
The studies in Table 1 are all based on fieldwork which predates ‘Euromaidan’ and the ‘revolution of 
dignity’ (‘revolyutsiya hidnosti’) which ousted Viktor Yanukovych from the Ukrainian presidency in 
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2014. During and after the Euromaidan protests, Russian officials and state media harshly criticised 
the Ukrainian demonstrators and depicted them as hooligans working to a Western agenda.55 Some 
Ukrainians apparently sympathised with this point of view: in one nationwide poll from October 
2014 (which excluded Crimea), around 30 per cent of respondents said Euromaidan had been a 
‘planned coup d’état’, against 38 per cent who saw it as citizens uniting to defend their rights and 17 
per cent who said it was a spontaneous popular protest.56 Support for the ‘coup d’état’ perspective 
was predictably higher in the East and South than in the West and Centre. However, any putative 
‘persuasive’ effect of the Russian state’s message in Ukraine was offset by indignation and anger 
which the message and subsequent Russian actions also provoked. In a nationwide poll from June 
2015 (again excluding Crimea), 60 per cent of respondents said their opinion of the Russian media 
had deteriorated since the start of the year.57 Biased coverage of Ukraine in the Russian media 
became a prominent news story in its own right, reported and criticised by many popular Ukrainian 
channels and publications. A journalist from a leading Ukrainian TV channel even managed to hand 
an ‘Oscar’ to a Russian correspondent live on air – for the ‘lies and nonsense’ propagated by Russian 
state TV.58 In 2016 it was estimated that only around 5 per cent of Ukrainians were continuing to 
watch Russian TV for news on a weekly basis;59 roughly 80 per cent of Ukrainians said they had a 
negative or very negative view of the Russian leadership;60 and the long-held Russian ambition of 
drawing Ukraine into regional integration initiatives has entirely disappeared from the agenda. 
From ‘soft power’ to linkage and strategic narrative reception 
If we return to thinking about how international persuasive communication is theorised, it should be 
clear why the ‘soft power’ framework is problematic. In Russia, Ukraine, the USA and Europe, state-
led international communication is being discussed in adversarial terms. This reflects the reality that 
government initiatives to persuade and attract were never quite as ‘softly’ non-disruptive as their 
proponents claimed, regardless of the states involved. Any communication aimed at persuasion has 
a competitive dimension, because persuasion only has meaning in contexts where opposing views 
are vying for acceptance. Likewise, ‘attraction’ only really matters when alternative centres of 
gravity are available. Nye underplays the competitive side of his soft power concept, insisting that ‘it 
is a mistake to see public diplomacy simply in adversarial terms... often there can be gains for both 
sides’.61 But his much-cited assertion that foreign policy success depends on ‘whose story wins’ 
(emphasis added) betrays a contradictory perspective that may be closer to reality: if one side ‘wins’, 
there surely has to be a ‘losing’ side too.62 It is fear of being undermined by geopolitical rivals which 
has driven the Russian government’s intensification of propaganda,63 and now a feedback loop is 
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emerging, with numerous Western politicians and commentators demanding countermeasures 
against the threat of ‘defeat’ by Russian (dis)information.64 
The competitive dimension of persuasive communication is acknowledged in recent research which 
critically reworks the soft power concept. Valentina Feklyunina, for example, proposes a ‘social 
constructivist take’, in which the soft power of State A vis-à-vis State B depends on (1) how widely 
narratives of collective identity projected by the former are accepted or resisted in the latter, and (2) 
how much influence the receptive audiences have over policymaking.65 This interpretation highlights 
the importance of the discursive context in which contestation between alternative narratives 
occurs. Alistair Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin and Laura Roselle go further in using the concept of 
narrative to explain how non-coercive influence works in international affairs. They build an 
innovative analytical framework around the concept of ‘strategic narrative’ – an assemblage of 
messages through which a state tries ‘to construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future 
of international politics’ and thereby shape others’ behaviour.66 A narrative can be understood as 
the accentuation and emplotment of particular problems or turning points in a way that indicates 
both causation and a normatively desirable resolution. Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle contend 
that narratives projected strategically can exert a dual kind of ‘power’ over behaviour: they may 
convince rational actors to act (consciously) in a particular way, while simultaneously constraining 
identities, understandings of the international system and thus the longer-term (subconscious) 
formation of interests. 
The strategic narrative framework has the additional advantage of being relatively straightforward 
to operationalise for a study of reception – more so than the vague notion of ‘attraction’ on which 
the soft power framework is based. The key elements of a particular strategic narrative (issues 
problematized, claims of causality and solutions advocated) can be identified from official 
statements and state-funded media content, then used as the basis for carefully designed questions, 
which are posed to different target audiences to assess whether they find the narrative convincing. 
The strategic narrative framework is therefore adopted to structure the following empirical analysis 
of persuasive communication in Ukraine. Three expectations derived from the earlier discussion of 
‘soft power’ are tested; namely: 
Hypothesis 1: Greater reliance on Russian news sources will predict greater support for the 
Russian strategic narrative over the Ukrainian strategic narrative. 
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Hypothesis 2: Stronger personal ties to Russia (such as regular communication with friends or 
relatives there, travel there, experience of life there) will predict stronger support for the 
Russian strategic narrative over the Ukrainian strategic narrative. 
Hypothesis 3: Stronger personal ties to Western countries (such as regular communication 
with friends or relatives there, travel there, experience of life there) will predict stronger 
support for the Ukrainian (pro-Western) strategic narrative over the Russian (anti-Western) 
strategic narrative. 
Three expectations derived from the area studies literature on Ukrainian public opinion are also 
investigated: 
Hypothesis 4: Being born in Russia will predict stronger support for the Russian strategic 
narrative over the Ukrainian strategic narrative. 
Hypothesis 5: A preference for watching television in the Russian language rather than in 
Ukrainian will predict stronger support for the Russian strategic narrative over the Ukrainian 
strategic narrative. 
Hypothesis 6: Regular attendance of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate will 
predict stronger support for the Russian strategic narrative over the Ukrainian strategic 
narrative. 
Before proceeding to the research itself, a few important comments about these hypotheses are in 
order. First, the hypotheses should not be interpreted as claims of mono-directional causality. 
Variations in media use, personal connections, language preferences and church attendance are 
expected to ‘predict’ variations in support for the Russian and Ukrainian strategic narratives, but 
only in the statistical sense. Varying support for the narratives might equally ‘predict’ varying 
patterns of media use, personal connections and so on. The problem of assessing causal direction in 
the hypothesised relationships will be discussed in the article’s concluding sections. 
Second, hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 have been formulated in a way that attempts to correct as much as 
possible for problems of endogeneity and categorisation that were not always recognised in 
previous research on Ukrainian public opinion. The response variables in the present investigation 
are measures of support for competing narratives. Attitudinal variables are not, therefore, used as 
predictors, because attitudinal variables would likely be endogenous to (i.e. alternative indicators of) 
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support for the narratives of interest. Dislike of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, for example, 
would probably correlate with any measure of support for Russia’s strategic narrative – but it would 
not meaningfully explain acceptance of the narrative since it constitutes acceptance of the narrative. 
A similar problem of endogeneity would arise with measures of identity that have been used in 
previous studies. Ukrainian survey respondents are often asked to place themselves into neat 
categories: ‘ethnic Russian’ or ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ (sometimes ‘mixed’), ‘Ukrainian-speaker’ or 
‘Russian-speaker’ (sometimes ‘speaks both’), ‘Orthodox’, ‘Greek-Catholic’ or ‘no religion’, and so on. 
Yet ethno-national identities in much of Ukraine are characterised by ‘ambivalence and instability’,67 
while many individuals ‘constantly switch from one language to another and often within the same 
sentence’ without even registering whether their words are Russian or Ukrainian.68 Many of those 
who describe themselves as ‘Orthodox’ or ‘believers’ never attend church. The ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious self-categorisations achieved in surveys are not always, therefore, reliable indicators of 
variation in culture, heritage or everyday practices. They may just as much reflect the individual’s 
acceptance of various ideas about national belonging which circulate in the public sphere. For 
instance, it is sometimes said that speaking or knowing Ukrainian is a vital part of being Ukrainian – 
and if a citizen believes this, it might increase their inclination to say (s)he ‘speaks both’ even if (s)he 
predominantly communicates in Russian. Meanwhile, the Russian government has long projected 
the idea that any individual who speaks Russian or has some ancestral ties to Russia is naturally 
‘belongs’ in a sense to the Russian homeland.69 By these criteria, a huge number of people living in 
Ukraine qualify to be Russian ‘compatriots’ if they wish – so whether or not they describe their 
identity as Russian (fully or partially) reflects the appeal of Moscow's strategic narrative relative to 
other, more local (and not necessarily strategic) narratives about identity. This is why the 
hypotheses in this study do not rely on ethnic, linguistic or religious self-identification, but rather on 
the less abstract measures of birthplace and habitual practices. The language hypothesis is 
formulated deliberately around passive language ability (TV viewing) instead of active language 
ability (speaking), because exposure to narratives depends more on the ability to understand than to 
speak fluently. Clear categorisation between Russian and Ukrainian also makes more sense in the 
context of television, where surzhyk (mixing of Russian and Ukrainian) is less common than in 
interpersonal communication. The hypothesis about religion focuses specifically on attendance of 
the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate because this church has lately been described as 
one of the Kremlin’s soft power ‘tools’.70 A regional effect is not hypothesised at all because the data 
used in this study come from only one Ukrainian region. The demographic variables found to be 
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influential in some previous research (age, income level, education level, settlement type, gender) 
are included as controls. 
A final comment, important for the subsequent discussion, is that most of the hypothesised 
predictor variables (media use, diverse personal connections, TV language preferences and religious 
attendance) can be thought of as types of ‘linkage’. In their book about transitions from 
authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way write that linkage is ‘rooted in concrete ties – networks; 
organizations; and flows of people, information, and resources – among states’.71 These ties, they 
argue, serve as transmitters of international influence. The present study investigates variables 
related to flows of people and information, i.e. the ‘social’ and ‘communication’ aspects of linkage.
Levitsky and Way were not concerned with the reception of strategic narratives. In fact, they 
explicitly set aside the possibility of linkage having ‘ideational’ mechanisms, focusing rather on how 
it affected the incentives of elite actors. Their work details how linkage to Western countries created 
incentives for democratisation in hybrid political systems. While acknowledging that ‘not all linkage 
is Western’,72 they operationalise the concept only in relation to Western states: they measure it by 
the extent of trade with the USA and EU states (‘economic ties’); the proportion of citizens travelling 
to or living in the USA and EU states (‘social ties’); international voice traffic and internet access per 
capita (‘communication ties’); and membership in the Organization of American States or eligibility 
for EU membership (‘intergovernmental ties’). These are all country-level measures, not individual-
level ones. 
The present study therefore takes Levitsky and Way’s conceptualisation of linkage in a new 
direction, adapting it for the purpose of the problem in hand. Here, the focus is on individuals rather 
than states; economic and intergovernmental aspects of linkage are set aside; and linkage is 
operationalised in relation to Russia as well as democratic Western countries. Yet the basic idea of 
linkage is helpful because it provides a way of looking at persuasive influence that is not centred on 
particular resources (policies, values, media etc.) generating advantageous attraction, but on 
individual patterns of behaviour which allow ideas to cross borders – with potentially diverse 
consequences. The implications of this more audience-focused perspective are elaborated further in 
the concluding sections. 
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Reception of Russia’s strategic narrative in Ukraine: an empirical analysis 
The data used in this study come from an original survey conducted between 6 and 18 February 
2016 by the market research company TNS Ukraine. The sample of 1,000 respondents was 
representative of the adult population of Odesa Region.73 The survey was restricted to a single 
region (oblast) partly due to budget limitations, but also in order to set aside the ‘regional effect’ 
question while interrogating sub-regional, individual-level explanatory variables more closely – 
particularly media use and personal ties to Russia. Odesa Region was selected because it belongs to 
the ‘south-eastern half’ of Ukraine which voted for relatively ‘pro-Russian’ candidates and parties in 
Ukrainian elections prior to 2014, yet it is also diverse in terms of its economy and linguistic 
composition. It has substantive interest in its own right, as it contains Ukraine’s third biggest city and 
is part of the territory named ‘Novorossiya’ (‘New Russia’) by Putin and Russian nationalists.74 In 
2014 Odesa was the scene of fatal clashes between supporters and opponents of the Euromaidan 
movement. Over 40 pro-Russian activists died in May that year when Odesa’s Trade Unions building 
was set alight during the unrest, an event described as a ‘massacre’ by Russian state television.75 
Ukrainian sociologists have since then identified Odesa Region as one where Russian propaganda is 
‘most effective’.76 
The survey questionnaire had three sections. The first section included questions about 
respondents’ socio-demographic background, personal ties to Russia and other countries, and how 
often they discussed issues of international relations (for the frequency distribution of variables 
based on these survey items see Table 2). 
The second section of the survey pertained to news consumption. Respondents were asked to 
specify the language in which they preferred to watch TV programmes and to estimate the time they 
spent consuming news and current affairs via television and the internet (again, see Table 2). They 
were also asked to name all the TV channels, radio stations, publications and websites they used to 
follow the news ‘during a normal week’. Responses were elicited via unaided recall rather presenting 
respondents with a list, so in aggregate they can be understood as ‘mindful’ news repertoires rather 
than ‘total’ news repertoires.77 Assessing media use though self-reports is notoriously problematic, 
but a list-based approach is now widely used and the open-ended list approach has been found to 
perform better than other techniques as a measure of true exposure.78 
Each respondent’s reliance on Russian sources was operationalised by dividing the number of 
mentioned Russian sources by the total number of mentioned news sources. This gives a rough 
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estimate of the importance of Russian sources in the respondent’s regular news media repertoire.79 
However, the question of whether a news source is ‘Russian’ is not always as straightforward as one 
might think due to partnerships between Russian and Ukrainian media companies.80 Moreover, 
Russian sources vary greatly in their degree of autonomy from the Russian authorities. Therefore, 
two variables are calculated, one based on a narrow definition of Russian media (the sources most 
clearly linked to the Kremlin),81 and one based on a broader definition (including more autonomous 
and commercial sources).82 In total, 14 per cent of respondents reported using at least one of the 
‘narrow definition’ Russian sources, while roughly 34 per cent of respondents reported using at least 
one of the ‘broad definition’ Russian sources. Reliance on Russian sources was generally quite low 
(see Table 3). Even among the minority of respondents who used one or more Russian news source 
(whether narrowly or broadly defined), these sources rarely constituted more than a third of 
individual news media repertoires; respondents used more Ukrainian sources than Russian ones. 
The third section of the survey questionnaire contained a series of questions intended to gauge 
support for the conflicting strategic narratives projected by the Russian and Ukrainian leaderships. 
Before formulating the questions, the strategic narratives themselves were traced by methodically 
analysing statements and speeches of the president and foreign minister of each country with the 
CAQDAS software Atlas.ti. All statements published on the Russian and Ukrainian presidential and 
Foreign Ministry websites between 1 October and mid-December 2015 were included in the 
analysis. Also studied were commentaries broadcast during the same period by Dmitriy Kiselev, 
presenter of weekly news show Vesti Nedeli on Russian state TV, who is considered a major 
spokesperson for the Russian strategic narrative; there is no journalist who plays an equivalent role 
in Ukraine. Coding focused on three principal dimensions of the statements and commentaries 
which are derived from the definition of narrative given in the previous section: (1) the definition of 
problems in current affairs, (2) claims about the causes of those problems, and (3) solutions 
advocated as normatively desirable. 
During the studied period certain topics were covered by both narratives from contradictory 
perspectives, and these became the focus of the survey questions. One set of questions asked 
respondents to state their level of agreement with alternative problem definitions from the two 
narratives, for example, ‘The USA violates the sovereignty of other countries’, or ‘Russia is trying to 
destabilize Ukraine’. A second set of questions asked respondents to choose between contradictory 
causal claims taken from the two narratives, for example, ‘Russian support for separatists’ versus 
‘Ukrainian unwillingness to give Donbas special status’ as explanations for why the conflict in eastern 
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Ukraine had not been resolved. A third set of questions asked respondents to choose between 
contradictory solutions advocated by the rival narratives which might ‘improve the situation in the 
world’, for example, the USA and Europe continuing sanctions against Russia, or the USA and Europe 
cooperating more closely with Russia (for a full list of these questions and the frequency distribution 
of responses, see Table 4 and Table 5). 
An exploratory factor analysis was run on the ‘problem definition’ set of survey items.83 A two-factor 
solution was found to account for 74 per cent of total variance (see Table 6). All the Russian problem 
definitions loaded onto Factor 1 and all the Ukrainian problem definitions loaded onto Factor 2, 
although one Russian problem definition (‘Countries of the West and Europe are losing interest in 
solving Ukraine’s problems’) cross-loaded and was therefore discarded from the analysis. The two 
factors were negatively correlated with a coefficient of -0.25.84  
A second exploratory factor analysis was run on the ‘causality’ and ‘solution’ sets of survey items.85 A 
single-factor solution was found to account for 48 per cent of total variance (see Table 7 in the 
Supplementary Materials).86 
The results of these factor analyses are consistent with the existence of two negatively correlated 
latent variables – support for the Ukrainian strategic narrative and support for the Russian strategic 
narrative – underlying responses to the narrative-based survey questions. For subsequent analysis, 
these latent variables are operationalised by standardizing the respondents’ scores on each 
narrative-based survey item, then calculating the unweighted mean of the standardized scores 
across the items contributing to each factor.87 This produces three measures of narrative support: 
(RV1) agreement with the Ukrainian problem definitions (based on Factor 1 from Table 6); (RV2) 
agreement with the Russian problem definitions (based on Factor 2 from Table 6); and (RV3) 
agreement with the Ukrainian causal attributions and solutions rather than the Russian causal 
attributions and solutions (based on Factor 1 from Table 7). Summary statistics for these three 
measures are presented in Table 8. 
Table 9 presents models which regress the three measures of narrative support (RV1, RV2 and RV3) 
on the hypothesized explanatory variables. The results support Hypothesis 1 that an individual will 
support the Russian narrative more (and the Ukrainian narrative less) the more (s)he relies on 
Russian news sources. Reliance on Russian media – whether narrowly or broadly defined – is among 
the strongest predictors of disagreement with Ukraine’s ‘anti-Russian’ problem definitions (Models 1 
and 2), causal claims and advocated solutions (Models 5 and 6). The association between reliance on 
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Russian media and supporting Russia’s ‘anti-Western’ problem definitions is somewhat weaker (in 
Model 3 it is not significant; in Model 4 it is significant only at the 0.1 level) although the coefficients 
point in the expected direction. It is worth noting that the association between disagreement with 
the Ukrainian narrative and using Russian news media is not driven solely by the ‘narrowly defined’ 
sources (i.e. Russia’s main federal channels and state news agency RIA Novosti). The more ‘broadly 
defined’ Russian sources (which include the popular social networks Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki) 
seem to have an effect of their own which can be observed in ‘time spent following news online’ 
having larger coefficients in Models 1 and 5 (where the narrow definition of Russian media was 
used) than in Models 2 and 6 (where the broad definition was used). 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 postulated that personal ties to Russia and Western countries (communication 
with friends and relatives there, regular travel and experience of life there) would predict reception 
of the rival narratives. Regular travel to Russia certainly seems to be significant: it is a strong 
predictor of disagreement with the Ukrainian narrative and agreement with the Russian narrative 
across all six models. However, experience of having lived in Russia was found to have no significant 
effect. Regular communication with friends or relatives in Russia had a small but significant positive 
effect on the respondents’ support for Russia’s ‘anti-Western’ problem definitions, as well as the 
Russian causal claims and advocated solutions, although it did not significantly affect support for 
Ukraine’s ‘anti-Russian’ problem definitions. Regular travel to Western countries was associated 
with stronger support for Ukraine’s ‘anti-Russian’ problem definitions, yet had no significant effect 
on support for Russia’s ‘anti-Western’ problem definitions nor on respondents’ views about causality 
and solutions. Experience of having lived in the West was associated with stronger support for the 
‘pro-Western’ Ukrainian narrative (problem definitions, causality and solutions) but no effect was 
observed on acceptance of Russia’s ‘anti-Western’ problem definitions. Communication with friends 
and relatives in the West, on the other hand, reduced support for Russia’s ‘anti-Western’ problem 
definitions while having no observable effect on support for Ukraine’s ‘anti-Russian’ problem 
definitions nor on views about causality and solutions. Overall, therefore, personal cross-border 
connections do seem to have influence in the expected direction – but different kinds of connection 
have different levels of ‘effect’ depending on the narrative elements under study. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that individuals born in Russia would be more inclined to support Russia’s 
strategic narrative over Ukraine’s strategic narrative. This hypothesis was not supported: country of 
birth had no effect on support for the different narratives in any of the models. 
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Hypothesis 5 was strongly supported by all the models. Respondents who preferred watching TV 
programmes in the Russian language demonstrated substantially lower support for Ukraine’s ‘anti-
Russian’ problem definitions, causal claims and advocated solutions, as well as greater support for 
Russia’s ‘anti-Western’ problem definitions, compared to respondents who preferred Ukrainian-
language programmes or had no preference between Russian and Ukrainian. Interestingly, no 
differences were observed between the respondents who preferred Ukrainian only and those who 
had no preference between Ukrainian and Russian. The ‘Russian-only’ TV viewers differed markedly 
from both. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that regular attenders of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow 
Patriarchate would support the Russian strategic narrative more than non-attenders, and this was 
borne out by Models 1-4. ROCMP attendance was a significant predictor of disagreement with the 
‘anti-Russian’ problem definitions from Ukraine’s strategic narrative and of agreement with the 
‘anti-Western’ problem definitions from Russia’s strategic narrative. However, church attendance 
had no observable effect on support for the causal claims and solutions from the two narratives. 
Among the socio-demographic and other variables investigated, age, income and the frequency of 
discussing international issues were the only ones to have significant effects on support for the 
different narratives. Older age corresponded with lower support for the Ukrainian strategic narrative 
and higher support for the Russian strategic narrative in all six models. The more often respondents 
discussed foreign affairs, the more they tended to support the ‘anti-Russian’ problem definitions, 
causal claims and advocated solutions from Ukraine’s strategic narrative (although no effect was 
observed on their support for Russia’s ‘anti-Western’ problem definitions). The reason for this 
association is not entirely clear. It may suggest that political engagement (reflected in frequency of 
political talk) is higher among more ‘patriotic’ respondents who have negative views of Russia. 
Alternatively, the current social climate in Odesa Region may be more conducive to expressing ‘anti-
Russian’ opinions in conversation. The findings for income are contradictory. Models 5 and 6 suggest 
that greater wealth is associated with more support for Ukraine’s strategic narrative over Russia’s, 
yet Models 3 and 4 found the low and middle income groups to be more likely than the lowest and 
highest income groups to support Russia’s ‘anti-Western’ problem definitions, while income had no 
significant effect in Models 1 and 2 (respondents are not necessarily open about their incomes; this 
might have affected results). The variables gender, education level and settlement type, as well as 
several plausible interaction effects, were tested but not found to be significant. 
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Linkage, strategic narrative reception and foreign policy ‘success’ 
By sticking to Russian-language TV, travelling regularly to Russia, communicating with acquaintances 
in Russia, using Russia-based news sources and attending a church headquartered in Moscow, some 
Ukrainian citizens maintain a connection to Russia, and these citizens express stronger than average 
support for the Russian state’s narrative about international affairs. On one level, this finding is 
unsurprising: it is consistent with the basic arguments of prior area studies work that religion and 
language matter for Ukrainian attitudes towards Russia, as well as widely held (but previously 
untested) assumptions about ‘Russian media influence’. 
The new step proposed here is to interpret these expected empirical relationships through the lens 
of linkage and ongoing processes of cross-border communication. Previous scholarship frequently 
pointed to identity-related factors – ‘native’ language, ‘ethnicity’ and declared religion – as 
explanations for foreign policy preferences and attitudes towards Russia among Ukrainians. But it 
tended to treat these factors as if they were static and exogenous; it said little about the individual 
communication-related activities that are integral both to the maintenance of identities and to the 
reception of competing ideas about international affairs. A relevant finding to emerge from the 
present analysis is that birthplace – a possible precursor to national identity – was insignificant for 
narrative reception among the studied population. Yet variables based on regular behaviours – 
church attendance, media consumption and interpersonal contact – did matter. 
What can be said about ‘causality’ in the relationship between linkage and strategic narrative 
reception? As already stated, the intention of this article is not to suggest that the predictor 
variables of linkage ‘cause’ variation in attitudes in a one-directional, linear fashion. Linkage should 
not be understood purely as a proxy for exposure, whereby the ‘stimulus’ of greater exposure to a 
given narrative generates an automatic ‘response’ of greater agreement. An obvious objection to 
the ‘stimulus-response’ view is that the relationship over time between exposure to and support for 
a narrative seems likely to be mutually reinforcing. If an individual sympathises with one narrative 
more than another, (s)he may be less likely to exclude the favoured narrative from his or her 
communicative environment, while giving less attention to contradictory perspectives. Over time, 
accustomisation to the favoured narrative might thereby have a structuring, limiting effect on how 
the individual understands the international system,88 rendering certain ideas or values taken-for-
granted, but this should be regarded as an ‘ongoing, dialectical process’ rather than an ‘aggregation 
of isolated causal collisions’.89 
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One can also think of ways besides long-term narrative exposure in which linkage is implicated in the 
process of narrative reception. Forms of linkage such as religious participation, cross-border travel 
and close personal relationships generate practical and emotional reasons to value friendly ties 
between one’s own state and another. Imagine someone living in Ukraine who has many friends and 
relatives in Russia and likes to visit them; or someone who happens to enjoy Russian-made, Russian-
language entertainment shows much more than Ukrainian-made, Ukrainian-language ones; or 
someone who prays for the fortunes of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine because they consider it 
the ‘true’ authority of faith. All such people might fear seeing something subjectively valuable to 
them disrupted by antagonistic Russian-Ukrainian relations which make cross-border flows of people 
and information more awkward. Correspondingly, they have more reason to support narratives that 
prioritise the restoration of bilateral ties, and to object against narratives which present the 
restoration of ties as a remote or undesirable prospect. In a sense, the behaviours which constitute 
linkage are not just conduits for ideas about values, they have value of their own which is liable to 
inform the reasoning of the people involved. Similarly, linkage is not just a conduit for narratives 
which establish a discursive divide between ‘us’ (the collective Self) and ‘them’ (the Other). Linkage 
consists of social behaviours through which individuals live out and reify their belonging to 
collectives that transcend state borders – be it the Orthodox Church, the ‘Soviet people’ or the 
‘Russian world’. Given these complexities, linkage cannot be understood as a set of independent 
variables which ‘generate an effect’ on attitudes. In the words of one non-positivist scholar:  
‘the conceptualization of factors as independent forces only impedes understanding of both 
their dynamic interactions and their cumulative significance over time for the subjects we are 
trying to understand.’90 
Some might regard the proposed idea of linkage as quite compatible with Nye’s concept of soft 
power, given that the latter does stress the importance of interpersonal contact and channels of 
communication. To the extent that soft power has become a ‘nebulous’ catchphrase,91 applied to all 
kinds of non-military forms of influence, there is some overlap. Yet the book which proclaimed soft 
power to be ‘the means to success in world politics’ began by stating that ‘soft-power resources are 
assets that produce attraction’, and then identified U.S. international broadcasting to be one such 
resource which ought to receive greater investment.92 The implication is that a reasonably 
straightforward linear relationship exists between the intensity of a state’s efforts to project a 
particular message and its prospect of achieving foreign policy goals. The crucial fact that a projected 
message is likely to elicit diverse responses in the context of competition from other messengers 
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was therefore obscured, and the challenge of explaining diverse responses – as tackled in this article 
– was not prioritised. 
It is not logical to assert that persuasive efforts will bring foreign policy success without first 
developing a fuller understanding of reception that encompasses all potential responses – not only 
the responses of targeted groups, but also those of competitors in the ‘market for loyalties’.93 State-
led persuasive efforts are clearly capable of generating backlash and divisions in addition to support. 
State A might, for example, see its strategic narrative becoming more widely accepted among the 
elite or general population of State B. For some scholars, these ‘minds changed’,94 or ‘views held’,95 
would already be evidence of ‘soft power’ (i.e. success) in action.  But at the same time, certain 
sections of the elite or population in State B (or C, or D) might reject State A’s narrative, increasingly 
resent its growing influence and seek to counter it. The outcome would thus be rising tension with 
potential for instability, which might be far from the goal State A had hoped to achieve. The problem 
mirrors that described by Forbes in relation to the contact hypothesis: an increase in inter-group 
affinity at the individual level does not necessarily mean conflict will decrease at the aggregate 
level.96 Success in projecting a narrative which resonates is one thing; success in achieving foreign 
policy goals may be quite another – so the fact these issues are conflated so regularly is problematic. 
In recent years both Western and Russian efforts to shape public opinion in foreign countries have 
drawn a strong backlash. The repressive measures Russia introduced domestically to counter the 
‘threat’ of Western democracy promotion are already well documented;97 its more active 
deployment of international broadcasters and pseudo-nongovernmental organisations in foreign 
policy is another aspect of the same response. Yet the Russian government’s own drive to promote 
narratives abroad has generated undesired outcomes too. Even before Euromaidan, Crimea and the 
Donbas conflict, influential sections of the Ukrainian elite were reacting with vocal criticism to 
Moscow’s promotion of a ‘Russian world’ encompassing Ukraine. Since 2014, the Ukrainian 
authorities have worked hard to curtail flows of information and people from Russia (direct flights 
have been banned, as have many Russian entertainment programmes and the cable transmission of 
Russian TV channels). Moreover, anti-Russian narratives are now the norm in mainstream Ukrainian 
journalism. Thus, despite extensive social and communicative linkage allowing wide dissemination of 
Russia’s narrative to the Ukrainian population, Russian strategic communication vis-à-vis Ukraine 
cannot be judged a success. Messages projected by the Russian government may have helped to 
polarise opinion in Ukraine, but polarisation was not, in fact, the original objective. Russia’s original 
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strategic objective was to draw Ukraine consensually into structures of regional alliance, and this 
now seems like a very distant prospect indeed. 
Reframing debates about state-led persuasion in international relations 
This article has identified a set of individual behaviours which predict variation in the reception of 
strategic narratives in Ukraine. It has adopted and adapted the concept of linkage to explain how 
these behaviours might play a role in narrative acceptance. Breaking from previous research on ‘soft 
power’, it has also pointed out that the acceptance of a strategic narrative by a target audience 
should not automatically be equated with ‘foreign policy success’ if negative responses from other 
audiences, including rival states, are elicited as well. 
The arguments developed here about the role of linkage are based on data from one Ukrainian 
region, and this raises questions about their broader relevance. It would be worth conducting similar 
studies elsewhere in Ukraine, for a start, to ascertain whether the observed relationships hold in 
other regions. The prospect of replicating the findings more widely within Ukraine would appear to 
be strong, given that language- and religion-related variables are already established as predictors of 
Ukrainian attitudes about Russia. In the present study, language use and religion were measured and 
interpreted in a slightly different way to usual (emphasising concrete social or communicative 
behaviours rather than abstract identities) and media use and interpersonal ties were introduced as 
important aspects of linkage that had previously been neglected. Future studies could perhaps 
compare the behaviour-based variables used here with more traditional measures of religious, 
linguistic and ethno-national identity, to see how they interact and which approach has the greater 
explanatory power. 
Looking beyond Ukraine, individual-level linkage seems most likely to affect strategic narrative 
reception in contexts where history or geography have allowed it to develop over time. Strategic 
narrative reception would need to be explained by other factors in cases where the extent of 
individual social and communicative linkage is too limited for its role to be significant. Linkage 
between Russia and Ukraine is unusually extensive – there are not many states, even neighbouring 
ones, whose populations are so linguistically, culturally and historically intertwined. It should be 
noted that the Russian news sources used by a substantial minority of Odesa Region residents are 
Russian domestic news sources; they were not designed to be ‘international broadcasters’ for 
foreign citizens. In most parts of the world, consumption of news from foreign sources will probably 
not be as high as it is in Odesa Region. Dedicated ‘international broadcasters’ that try to reach 
This is the pre-publication version of an article (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X) 
published in Perspectives on Politics (2017) 15, 2, pp. 379–395. Please cite the published version. 
This version is for private research and study; it must not be distributed further. 
All tables are in a separate file. 
 
Page 23 of 32 
 
geographically and culturally distant populations often have relatively low audience shares (this 
applies to the Russian state channel RT in the United Kingdom, for example). 
However, linkage as a factor in the persuasive process would be worth investigating in other parts of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For example, citizens in Moldova, Belarus and Armenia 
face a similar ‘choice’ of narratives which lead in different foreign policy directions – towards Russia 
and the Eurasian Union, or towards the European Union and ‘the West’. These citizens also maintain 
varying levels of personal, linguistic and cultural ties to different nearby states, just like Ukrainian 
citizens do. There is currently concern about the ‘influence of Russian propaganda’ in the countries 
of Eastern Europe. Reframing this issue in terms of linkage and strategic narrative reception could 
help shift analysis away from a simplistic ‘stimulus-response’ model of media effects, towards a 
more holistic appreciation of how views of international politics shape and are shaped by the social 
and communicative practices of individuals. 
This article set out to explain the reception of two strategic (long-term) narratives that are clearly 
‘geopolitical’ in nature – they describe ‘heroes and antagonists’ on the international stage. The 
reception of messages that are less strategic and less geopolitical would probably be less affected by 
linkage. For example, the Russian government is accused of financing all kinds of media content that 
worked to Donald Trump’s advantage in the 2016 American presidential election (particularly 
conspiracy theories and leaks damaging to Hillary Clinton). Reception of this more ‘tactical’ kind of 
messaging about specific domestic political issues lies beyond the scope of this study. 
A general conclusion of the present article is that ‘soft power’ should cease to be the default label 
for the study and practice of mass persuasion in international politics. Soft power implies that efforts 
to change political preferences among foreign populations are benign and unobtrusive; in reality 
they may provoke resentment and retaliation. Soft power implies that states ‘get what they want’ by 
persuading foreign audiences, but this is questionable when persuasion or attempts to persuade are 
followed by backlash and division. The same resources which help ‘attract’ some Ukrainians to 
Russia (i.e. church and media) repel other Ukrainians, because different audiences receive and 
respond to narratives in different ways. Any resource-based account of how persuasion works is 
therefore inherently problematic. 
This article has suggested that linkage is more than just a conduit for discourse. Cross-border travel 
and talk, media consumption and religious participation are likely to affect an individual’s exposure 
to different narratives over time. However, their significance for narrative reception may also lie in 
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the fact that an individual will resist narratives which ‘threaten’ the cross-border activities and 
contacts which (s)he values. This point is pertinent to the promotion of liberal democracy in 
culturally Russified areas via the media and information campaigns. Unfortunately, the narratives 
which promote liberal democracy are very often narratives which also depict Russia as a threat and 
interaction with Russia (‘Russian influence’) as generally undesirable. If pro-democracy narratives in 
the media were less thoroughly ‘geopoliticised’, they might go down better among individuals who 
have strong ties to Russia which they value and wish to maintain. 
Although this article has emphasised the risk of backlash associated with state-led efforts to 
persuade foreign audiences in a competitive discursive environment, it does not mean to imply that 
such efforts should not take place. It is inevitable that conflicting strategic narratives will be 
projected in the course of international politics. From a normative viewpoint, one may consider it 
right to project narratives promoting democracy irrespective of how non-democratic governments 
react. However, there should be greater recognition of the fact that the reception of a strategic 
narrative will sometimes have little to do with how ‘skilfully’ it is deployed, nor with how widely and 
actively it is disseminated, nor even with how faithful it is to the ‘truth’. Credibility is not an objective 
property of a source or message, but a receiver perception.98 Individuals will assess the credibility of 
strategic narratives against the yardstick of their existing views of the international system – views 
that are likely to have been shaped over time by the behaviours described in this article as ‘linkage’. 
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